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method of interpreting nature and who regard that method as in hopeless conflict with our spiritual needs as ordinarily interpreted, but who nevertheless believe that the realm of spiritual values suffices for itself, and that the truth of a religion, like the truth of a poem, suffers only indignity if treated as a truth about nature. And there are many others who, not attaining this last insight, have felt compelled in giving up the existential truth of religion to abandon it altogether. These latter would doubtless be grateful enough if they could be instructed how to get back their religious ideals by adopting a purely symbolic interpretation of them. If this is a fair account of the situation, it seems something of a pity that Professor Münsterberg should bar the door to his philosophy with what is, to put it mildly, a very formidable epistemological contrivance. Would the real significance of his metaphysics be seriously impaired if, like Mr. Santayana, he were content to depict the world of existence as the world of Democritus, in the blind flux of which, however, are perpetually reflected the eternal ideas of Plato—ideals and values which, though impotent to direct the course of things, are potent to glorify and illumine it? Then, if the picture were felt to be too somber, there would still be time to invoke the Kantian and Fichtean epistemology and, by a mystical *tour de force*, ‘deduce’ the world of nature from the over-individual postulating activity of its inhabitants. I do not believe that the subjectivistic theory itself, if thus postponed, would appeal less strongly to the choice spirits who can understand it, while I feel sure that such a rearrangement would make the system as a whole much more plausible and attractive to the common person.

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Deutsche Skeptiker: Lichtenberg-Nietzsche. Zur Psychologie des neueren Individualismus. ROBERT SAITSCHICK. Berlin: Ernst Hofmann & Co. 1906. Pp. 239.

Französische Skeptiker: Voltaire-Mérimée-Renan. Zur Psychologie des neueren Individualismus. ROBERT SAITSCHICK. Berlin: Ernst Hofmann & Co. Pp. 304.

In these two interesting volumes the author has put into a popular form the philosophic systems, or, more properly, the unsystematic philosophies of five thinkers,—Lichtenberg, Nietzsche, Voltaire, Mérimée and Renan. Experts in philosophy will not find here much that is original or suggestive. Dr. Saitschick has attempted little or no critical and constructive work. Throughout the two volumes his main purpose is to interpret the doctrines of the men about whom he has written, and in this aim he has succeeded admirably. His discussions are lucid and accurate expositions.

Students in the history of philosophy will find serious objections to the author's classifying all of these five thinkers as skeptics. Skepticism becomes attenuated to a meaningless term when we make it include such divergent doctrines. All of these men are, to be sure, ‘doubting philos-

ophers,' but the objects about which they are skeptical are various. For example, Lichtenberg was an uncompromising atheist, while Voltaire was a pronounced deist. As the author rightly contends, it is Voltaire's almost fanatical hostility to Christianity that has led many to class him among the atheists. Then, too, Nietzsche is no skeptic, at least not in the sense in which Pyrrho, the father of skepticism, employed the word. We have nowhere among these five thinkers any consistent suspending of judgment about the nature of fundamental reality. They are all of them very positive that nothing can be known about the ultimate constitution of the universe. The term agnostic, or positivist, would more nearly fit them all. Again, the subtitle, 'For the Psychology of the Later Individualism,' is inapt. One could apply the term individualism to the philosophy of Spinoza or Plotinus as appropriately as to that of Nietzsche or Mérimée.

The author says of Lichtenberg: "He is no systematic thinker: he did not deduce his doctrines from certain fundamental postulates by a rigid logic." This same confession, in a slightly different form, he is obliged to make of the others, with the exception of Nietzsche. Their philosophic doctrines in the end are found to be merely collections of aphorisms, brilliant and subtle at times, but just as frequently illogical and shallow. Of the five, Nietzsche is easily the greatest philosopher; and the reader is disappointed that the author did not follow out the profound logic of this pessimistic philosophy and show how it at last reveals a deep-lying contradiction. Some interesting suggestions for a psychology of pessimism are found scattered through these two volumes. It is for the most part a group of chronic invalids that Dr. Saitschick has selected to represent modern skepticism. He himself admits that the various pessimistic doctrines of his representative thinkers may be due in large measure to their continual ill health.

The general reader will find these books interesting and useful, but the members of the guild of philosophers will hardly feel that they fulfill the promise of their suggestive titles.

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The Logical Issue of Radical Empiricism. J. E. RUSSELL. *Philosophical Review*, November, 1906. Pp. 606-613.

Professor Russell's article states in concise form two reasons why radical empiricism may justly be charged with solipsism. It is argued, first, that solipsism is the logical deduction from the empiricist's general notion of experience. Thought is held to be purely derivative and of significance only in so far as it has a cash value in terms of concrete experience. But experience, whether we consider the *terminus a quo* or the *terminus ad quem* 'is undeniably just this individual's own experience; as such, it has for its defining character, its *quale*, a "this-mine" quality' (p. 607). And the transitional states show precisely the same unique, unsharable quality. For this reason they can exist only between experiences of the same individual.